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Abstract—The communication of a wireless sensor network
can be eavesdropped quite easily due to its properties, thereby
requiring a security mechanism. Adding a key management
scheme on the wireless sensor network is a kind of solution.
This paper proposes a method to enhance the security of the
existing random key pre-distribution scheme, that is considered
to be suitable in wireless sensor networks. Using a little additional
memory and computation, the proposed approach reduces the
amount of information revealed when a sensor node is captured
and thus makes a wireless sensor network that uses the ran-
dom key pre-distribution scheme more secure. We analyze the
proposed approaches by considering two measurements: ACL
(number of additional compromised links) and AID (the average
insecurity degree). ACL measures the resilience against the node
capturing problem and AID measures the security of each link
key. The experimental results match the analysis and show that
the security of the wireless sensor network is enhanced about
50%.
I. INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network consists of a large number of
tiny, low-power, cheap sensor nodes having sensing, data pro-
cessing, and wireless communication components [1]. There
are many applications for wireless sensor networks, including
battleﬁeld surveillance, machine failure diagnosis, biological
detection, inventory tracking, home security, smart spaces,
environmental monitoring, and so on [2]. In some applications,
like the applications on military or business, the corresponding
wireless sensor networks should be more secure.
An effective key management can make a wireless sensor
network secure. The following reasons post a challenging work
for designing a good and appropriate key management scheme
in wireless sensor networks. First, by using wireless media,
the communication between the sensor nodes in a sensor
network can be eavesdropped easily. Second, a wireless sensor
network consists of a large number of tiny sensor nodes. The
resource on each sensor node is therefore limited, including
energy, computation ability, and memory storage. Thus, the
key management scheme should consume as less resource as
possible for each sensor node. Last, a wireless sensor network
usually does not have a centralized server which can serve as
the key server of the key management. The way to manage
all the keys should be distributed.
Many key management schemes for wireless sensor net-
works have been proposed [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10],
[11], [12], [13]. Some of them are considered to be quite
practicable, although they have some defects. The random
key pre-distribution (RKP) scheme in [15] is one of them
and constructs a key pool which consists of a large number of
keys. Each sensor node then randomly picks a certain number
of keys from the key pool and stores them into its memory
before it is deployed. The basic idea of this scheme is that
any two sensor nodes have a probability of picking the same
key from the key pool and this key can be used as their
link key if these two sensor nodes want to establish a secure
communication. Many key management schemes follow this
basic idea with some modiﬁcation, including the q-composite
scheme [16], the key management scheme using deployment
knowledge [14], the polynomial based scheme [17], and the
key matrix based scheme [18].
The contributions of this paper is that it proposed a method
to improve the security of the existing random key pre-
distribution scheme. Combining the proposed method with
the original scheme, this paper proposed an enhancement
scheme. Furthermore, the proposed method can be used on
other RKP based key management schemes. This paper also
provide analysis on two measurements on the security issue
along with the simulation results. This rest of this paper is
organized as follows. Section II describes the original RKP
scheme and the idea of hash function. Section III demonstrates
the problem this paper tries to solve and the proposed scheme.
Section IV evaluates the performance of the proposed and
original schemes using two measurements on security, namely
the ACL and AID. Section V shows the experimental results
on ACL and AID of both schemes. Section VI concludes this
paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
A. The RKP Scheme
The random key pre-distribution scheme is considered to
be a suitable key management scheme for wireless sensor
networks. It consists of three main phases as follows.
1) Phase 1: This phase is executed before the sensor nodes
are deployed and is usually called the key predistribution
phase. In this phase, a key pool which consists of a large
number of keys will ﬁrst be generated. Each of the keys
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pool is generated, each sensor node will randomly pick
a certain amount of keys without deleting them from the
key pool and store the chosen keys into its memory as
its own key ring. Note that, for any two sensor nodes,
there is a probability to have a same key. After all of
the sensor nodes have derived their key rings, they will
be deployed into the sensing ﬁeld.
2) Phase 2: This phase is often also referred to as the
shared key discovery phase. In Phase 1, the keys are
pre-installed into the memory of each sensor nodes.
After the sensor nodes are deployed, the shared key
discovery phase starts. In this phase, each node will try
to ﬁnd a common key with all of its neighbors. When a
sensor node u wants to ﬁnd a shared key with its own
neighbors, it sends a message containing the key-ids of
the keys in its key ring to all of its neighbors. When a
neighboring node v receives this message, node v tries
to ﬁnd a shared key by comparing the key-ids in the
message and in its key ring.
3) Phase 3: The last phase is also called the path key estab-
lishment phase. When two neighboring sensor nodes can
not ﬁnd a shared key, they will perform the third phase.
In this phase, any two neighboring sensor nodes will
try to establish a path key if they can not ﬁnd a shared
key in the previous phase. We use (u,v) to denote that
nodes u and v are neighbors and they have a shared key.
When two neighboring sensor nodes w and z have no
shared key and want to establish a path key, they will try
to ﬁnd a secure path, consisting of a series of pairs of
neighboring sensor nodes having shared keys. In other
words, a path (w,w1),(w1,w2),...,(wn−1,wn),(wn,z)
from w to z will be found. If all of the messages between
w and z are transmitted through this path afterwards, it
will consume too much resources because it requires
multiple times of encryption and decryption each time
to send a single message. Therefore, they must use this
path to agree on a path key as their encryption key. The
path key can be generated by any one of the two sensor
nodes and sent to the other one through this path. The
easiest way to generate such a path key is to use one
of the sensor node’s keys in its key ring that does not
belong to its shared keys. When the two nodes have
agree on a path key, they can use this path key as their
link key.
Figure 1 shows the algorithm of the three phases in the RKP
scheme.
B. Hash Functions
In order to enhance the security of the two original schemes,
the idea of hash functionis very much helpful. A cryptographic
hash function H() is a function that is considered to have the
following prerequisite properties:
1) Preimage resistant: Given the output k′, it should be
hard to ﬁnd any k such that k′ = H(k).
Phase 1
(1) Generate the key pool and each node randomly choose
keys from the key pool for its key ring.
(2) Each node must also store the key-ids as well.
Phase 2
(3) For each neighboring nodes, compare the key-ids in their
key rings.
(4) If they ﬁnd a same key-id, the link key is discovered.
(5) Else if they cannot ﬁnd a same key, perform the next
phase.
Phase 3
(8) For each pair of neighbors w and z that do not have a
link key, try to ﬁnd a path (w,w1), (w1,w2),...,(wn−1,wn),
(wn,z), where (x,y) represents that sensor nodes x
and y are neighbors and having a link key.
(9) Sensor nodes w and z can use the above path to agree on
a key as their link key.
End
Fig. 1. The high-level description of RKP scheme.
2) Collision resistant: It should be hard to ﬁnd two
different messages k1 and k2 such that H(k1) = H(k2).
Although any kind of function that satisﬁes the above two
properties can be used for the proposed method, we will
consider the well-known hash functions as the ﬁrst priority.
The most popular hash functions includes the MD5 (Message-
Digest algorithm 5) designed by Ronald Rivest in 1992 and
the SHA-1 designed by the National Security Agency in 1995.
However, these two hash functions are considered not entirely
secured and may have some security threat [19], [20], [21].
Therefore, this paper uses the SHA-2 algorithm which is
another hash function in the SHA series for the proposed
scheme.
III. PROBLEM AND PROPOSED SOLUTION
In a wireless sensor network, the sensor nodes can be easily
captured by an attacker. All of the information in the captured
sensor nodes will thus be revealed and the attacker can obtain
the encryption keys. We refer to this problem as the node
capturing problem. For the key management schemes which
are not based on the RKP scheme, the sensor nodes only store
their own link keys. When a sensor node is captured, only its
own link keys will be revealed. In contrast, for the random key
pre-distribution based schemes, the node capturing problem
leads to the following problem. Recall that, in RKP based
schemes, each sensor node stores its own link keys and some
other possible link keys. When a sensor node is captured, the
link keys that are not used by this sensor node may be revealed.
In other words, when a sensor node is captured in a wireless
sensor network using the RKP scheme, this captured node will
reveal additional information about the link keys of the other
sensor nodes.
The node capturing problem is inevitable in a wireless sen-
sor network. In order to alleviate the impact of node capturing
problem for the RKP based schemes, this paper proposes a
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basic idea of the proposed approach is to hash the keys in the
key pool of the random key pre-distribution scheme with a
one-way hash function. Once a key is chosen by a sensor node,
it will be hashed by the predeﬁned one-way hash function. If
another sensor node chooses the same key afterwards, instead
of using the same key as the previous sensor node, it will
derive a new different key by hashing the key value. If the
new hashed key has been selected, the key value will be hashed
again to become a new key. When a sensor node is captured,
it will not reveal the keys of the other sensor nodes since the
one-way hash function is not invertible. We therefore refer to
the proposed approach as the RKP scheme by hashing (RKP-
H).
The RKP-H scheme also consists of three main phases:
1) Phase 1: A key pool will also be generated ﬁrst for
each sensor node to pick keys randomly like the RKP
scheme. After a sensor node picks a key from the key
pool, this key will be hashed using a pre-deﬁned one-
way hash function H. By doing so, when another sensor
node tries to pick the same key again, it will get the
hashed key instead of the exact same key. In addition,
the key pool and each sensor node’s key rings will not
only store the keys and the key-ids, but also the number
of times that the keys are hashed. Each node will store
the predeﬁned hash function H. For example, suppose
node u chooses the key with key-id i for its key ring. Key
ki will be stored in u’s key ring and ki will be replaced
with H(ki) in the key pool. If node v also chooses the
key with key-id i for its key ring afterward, node v will
get H(ki) instead of ki. The keys with key-id i in node
u and v will be ki and H(ki) = k′
i , respectively.
2) Phase 2: Like the basic random key pre-distribution
scheme, any two neighboring sensor nodes will try to
ﬁnd a shared key for communication in this phase.
When a sensor node wants to ﬁnd a shared key with its
neighbors, the message it sends will not only contains
the key-ids but also the number of times each key is
hashed. The neighbor receiving such a message will
ﬁrst compare the key-ids. If it ﬁnds a same key-id, it
will then compare the number of times that the key is
hashed. If the key it holds is hashed more times, it will
decide to use its key as the shared key and send back
a message containing the key’s key-id and how many
times the original sensor node should hash its key with
the speciﬁc key-id in order to get the shared key. If the
key it holds is hashed less times, it will obtain the shared
key by hashing the key it holds and send back the key
id and speciﬁes that the original sensor node does not
need to hash its key. For example, suppose the nodes u
and v mentioned in the previous phase are neighbors.
They can establish their shared key H(ki) in this phase.
Node u can obtain H(ki) by hashing the key ki in its
key ring, and node v already has H(ki) in its key ring.
3) Phase 3: Since the shared keys have been discovered at
Phase 1
(1) Generate the key pool and each node randomly choose
keys from the key pool for its key ring.
(2) Each time a key ki is selected, replace it with H(ki) in
the key pool and increase its h by 1.
Phase 2
(3) For each neighboring nodes, compare the key ids in their
key rings.
(4) Compare the hs for all of the keys with the same key id.
(5) For the node with smaller h, hash the key for m times.
Phase 3
(8) For each pair of neighbors w and z that do not have a
link key, try to ﬁnd a path (w,w1), (w1,w2),...,(wn−1,wn),
(wn,z), where (x,y) represents that sensor nodes x
and y are neighbors and having a link key.
(9) Sensor nodes w and z can use the above path to agree on
a key as their link key.
End
Fig. 2. The high-level description of RKP-H scheme.
the previous phase, there is barely any modiﬁcation in
this phase. Any two neighboring sensor nodes that do
not have a shared key will also try to ﬁnd a secure path
to agree on a path key as described in the basic random
key pre-distribution scheme.
Figure 2 shows the algorithm of the three phases in the
RKP-H scheme. The notations used in the algorithm is as
follows: ki is the key with key id i, H() is the predeﬁned
hash function, h is the number of times that a key is hashed,
and m is the difference between two hs.
IV. ANALYSIS
In order to measure the performance of our proposed
approach, we consider two measurements: (1) the number
of additional compromised links, ACL, and (2) the average
insecurity degree, AID. The ACL measures the resilience
against the node capturing problem by ﬁnding the fraction of
additional communications that an attacker can compromise
based on the information retrieved from the captured nodes.
The AID measures, for each link key, how many other nodes
will the reveal information about that shared key when they
are captured.
A. Additional Compromised Links
Assume that when a sensor node is captured, the probability
that any key k is compromised is p1. The probability that any
key k is not compromised when a node is compromised will
be (1 − p1). When x nodes are captured, the probability that
any key k is not compromised will be (1−p1)x. The expected
fraction of total keys being compromised when x nodes are
captured is 1−(1−p1)x, which is the ACL for the RKP and
RKP-H scheme. Now we have to ﬁnd the value of p1 for both
schemes in order to obtain the true ACL value.
Let Sk be the set of the keys that has the same key-id as key
k and is sorted in the order that each key was been picked.
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it will reveal |Sk| − 1 keys if the node that possesses k is
captured where |Sk| is the size of Sk. Therefore, the p1 of k
is |Sk| − 1. In the RKP-H scheme if k is located ﬁrst in Sk,
it will reveal |Sk| − 1 other keys if the node that possesses k
is captured since other keys in |Sk| are hashed less times than
k. Likewise, if k is located last in Sk, it will reveal 0 other
keys. The p1 of k in the RKP-H scheme is
(0 + 1 + ··· + |Sk| − 1)
|Sk|
=
1
2
× (|Sk − 1|).
Let P be the key pool size and r be the key ring size.
The probability that any key k is compromised when a node
is captured will be r
P in the RKP scheme. In the RKP-H
scheme, the value will become 1
2× r
P according to the previous
analysis. Therefore, the expected fraction of total keys being
compromised in the RKP and RKP-H scheme will be 1−(1−
r
P )x and 1−(1− 1
2 × r
P )x respectively when x sensor nodes
are captured.
B. Average Insecure Degree
This part of analysis will evaluate the AID value for all of
the schemes. The AID measures, for each link key, the number
of nodes that will reveal information about the link key if they
are captured. The notations used in the analysis are as follows:
j is the key id of key kj, Tj is the set of nodes that selected
the key with key id j, |Tj| is the size of Tj, and N is the
network size. We assume that the nodes in Tj are sorted in
the order that they selected the key. That is, the key possessed
by the node in front of Tj is hashed less times than in the
back.
Assume that the two nodes use kj as their link key are node
u and v, and u is in the front of v in Tj. For the RKP scheme,
there are
￿|Tj|
2
￿
possible combinations of u and v in Tj. For
each combination, there are (|Tj| − 2) nodes that will reveal
information about key kj. The AID for kj is
(|Tj| − 2)
￿|Tj|
2
￿
￿|Tj|
2
￿ = |Tj| − 2.
As for the entire network, the AID will be
(N−2)r
P .
In the RKP-H scheme, not all of the nodes that belong to
Tj will reveal kj when they are been captured. It depends on
the position of the captured node and the two nodes that use
kj in Tj. If the two nodes u and v are the ﬁrst two nodes in
Tj, no other nodes in Tj will reveal kj since that all other
keys with key-id j are hashed more times than the link key
kj. If v is the third node and u is the ﬁrst or second node,
there is one node which is the ﬁrst node in Tj that will reveal
kj. If we keep on calculating for the rest of the combinations,
the result of the total number of nodes that will reveal kj will
be
0 · 1 + 1 · 2 + 2 · 3 + ··· + (|Tj| − 2) · (|Tj| − 1). (1)
Scheme ACL AID
RKP 1 − (1 − r
P )x (N−2)r
P
RKP-H 1 − (1 − 1
2 × r
P )x 2·(N−2)r
3·P
TABLE I
THE ACL AND AID OF BOTH SCHEMES
Since that there are
￿|Tj|
2
￿
combinations in total, the average
AID of the link key kj is
0 · 1 + 1 · 2 + 2 · 3 + ··· + (|Tj| − 2) · (|Tj| − 1)
￿|Tj|
2
￿ . (2)
Since
0 · 1 + 1 · 2 + 2 · 3 + ··· + n(n + 1) =
n(n + 1)(n + 2)
3
,
Equation(1) can be written as
(|Tj|−2)(|Tj|−1)(|Tj|)
3 , and Equa-
tion(2) will be
(
(|Tj| − 2)(|Tj| − 1)(|Tj|)
3
)(
2
(|Tj|)(|Tj| − 1)
) =
2
3
·(|Tj|−2).
Thus, the AID for kj is 2
3 · (|Tj| − 2) in the RKP-H scheme
which is 2
3 of the RKP scheme. As for the entire network, the
AID will be 2
3 ·
(N−2)r
P in the RKP-H scheme. Table 1 shows
the ACL and AID for both schemes.
V. SIMULATIONS
In addition to the analysis, we perform the experimental
simulation. We use C++ programming language for the simu-
lations. The sensor network and all sensor nodes are simulated
with different measurements depending on each simulation.
All the results match what we have analyzed. We here present
two fundamental results due to the space. Figure 3 shows the
results on the ACL about the RKP scheme and the proposed
RKP-H scheme. In this experiment set, the number of sensor
nodes is 10,000, the key pool size is 100,000, and the key
ring size is 200 with a probability 0.33 to set up a link. As
shown in the plot, the value of ACL grows as the number of
capture sensor nodes increases for both schemes. The RKP-H
can reduce the ACL in about 50%.
Figure 4 presents the performance of the RKP scheme and
the RKP-H scheme in terms of AID. In this experiment set,
the number of sensor nodes is 1,000 and the key pool size is
10,000. We consider the AID values with different key ring
sizes. A general trend is that the AID value increases as the
key ring size becomes bigger. Furthermore, the AID values of
RKP-H are about 30% less than the AID values of RKP.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper considers the RKP scheme and focuses on
the node capturing problem. The proposed method RKP-H
outperforms the RKP scheme in terms of ACL and AID
measurements and can reduce the amount of information
revealed when a sensor node is captured for about 30% to
50%. What the proposed approach pays is a little additional
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being compromised when c nodes have been captured in the RKP and RKP-H
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Fig. 4. The experimental result of the average number of nodes that will
reveal information about a certain pair of link key when they are captured
with each node has 40 neighbors in RKP and RKP-H schemes, respectively.
computation and memory cost. Each sensor node only needs to
store the predeﬁned one-way hash function and performs this
hash function several times at the key setup phase. The results
of the experimental simulation match the analytical results.
And the proposed method also can be adapted to other random
key pre-distribution based schemes including the q-composite
scheme and the key management scheme using deployment
knowledge which we are currently working on.
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